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Exemption From National Laws Does Not
Violate Equal Protection
I. INTRODUCTION
In Stop H-3 Association v. Dole (Stop H-3),1 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that a federal statute" which specifically ex-
empted an interstate highway project in the State of Hawaii from meeting the
requirements of federal environmental protection laws' did not violate equal
protection rights of the state's citizens.4 The court found substantial national
and state interests to warrant dismissing the equal protection claims of the
plaintiffs in the case. The court's decision focused on congressional intent to
complete the project, as evidenced by the statute's legislative history, and on
congressional power to make the exemption.
Section II of this note states the facts of Stop H-3. Section III gives a histori-
cal overview of the development of equal protection law and discusses the stan-
dards of review currently utilized by the courts in equal protection cases. Section
IV analyzes the court's rationale for ruling that the federal statute did not vio-
late equal protection, and Section V discusses the potential impact of the court's
decision on future equal protection challenges involving a congressional exemp-
tion of a specific project from federal laws.
II. FACTS
Interstate Highway H-3 (H-3), as planned, is a six-lane freeway that will
extend across the Koolau Mountains on the island of Oahu.5 The highway will
connect the Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station on the windward side of the
870 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).
a See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
s See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text for a description of plaintiffs' various claims.
s Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434, 438, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).
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island to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base on the leeward side.' While two conven-
tional highways' also provide trans-Koolau access, population projections made
by the State of Hawaii suggested that these highways would be inadequate by
the year 2000.'
Nearly 16 years of litigation to block construction of the H-3 resulted in
significant disruptions to the highway's completion." First, the H-3 was rede-
signed to remove it from Moanalua Valley because of the valley's historic im-
port 10 Second, until the latest litigation, an injunction had been in place for
nearly all of the years since the 1972 challenge to construction was initiated.11
Further, the requirements of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, section 4(f)1 were
6Id.
7 Neither the Pali Highway nor the Likelike Highway are interstate highways.
s Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1422, 1455-58 (9th Cit. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1108 (1985), discussed the impact of H-3 on traffic demands. The Ninth Circuit was uncon-
vinced that the H-3 was necessary to accommodate the increases in traffic projected and had ruled
that the "No Build Alternative," (a justification hurdle that the Highway had to overcome since
it impacted upon parkland) was not met in the Environmental Impact Statements filed to date.
Id. at 1458.
9 The 16-year litigation history is as follows: Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 349 F. Supp. 1047 (D.
Haw. 1972); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 14 (D. Haw. 1972); Stop H-3 Ass'n v.
Brinegar, 389 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Haw. 1974), rev'd. sub noma., Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533
F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Lewis, 538 F. Supp.
149 (D. Haw. 1982), afd in part and rev'd in part, 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985); Stop H-3 v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1108 (1985).
"0 Despite the State's assertion that Moanalua Valley was of "marginal" local historical impor-
tance as determined by the Historic Places Review Board in their Minutes of the Meeting of the
Historic Places Review Board, August 5, 1974, the Ninth Circuit held that the potential for
registry in the National Register of Historical Places was sufficient to cause the H-3 to comply
with Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966. Stop H-3 v. Coleman, 533
F.2d 434, 440 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976). See infra note 12 for text of Section
4(f).
"s Injunctions blocking construction had been in place since 1972 except for nearly a year
when the District Court, in 1983, dissolved the injunctions and construction began pending an
appeal to the Ninth Circuit which reinstituted the injunction. Stop H-3 v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442,
1447 n.1 (9th Cit. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985).
12 Department of Transportation Act of 1966, S 4(f), 49 U.S.C. S 303 and § 18 of the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138, which contains nearly identical language,
are together commonly referred to as "section 4(f) requirements."
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act provides:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to
preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wild-
life and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites. The Secretary of Transportation shall cooper-
ate and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban Development and
Agriculture and with the States in developing transportation plans and programs that in-
dude measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed. After
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found to apply to the H-3 wherever it abutted protected land,1 s so that the
highway had to meet the environmental protections of section 4(f)14 where it
abutted Ho'omaluhia Park and the Pali Golf Course.1 5
On October 18, 1986, the President of the United States signed a Continu-
ing Appropriations Bill that induded section 114, a provision that exempted
the H-3 from the requirements of section 4(f), with the intent of paving the
way for the rapid construction of the highway." The State of Hawaii had urged
its congressional delegation to attempt such an exemption in the face of delays
August 23, 1968, the Secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires
the use of any publicly owned land from a public park, recreation area or wildlife and
waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance as determined by the Federal,
State, or local officials having jurisdiction thereof, unless (1) there is no feasible and pru-
dent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible plan-
ning to minimize harm to such park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or
historic site resulting from such use.
Id.
18 Stop H-3 v. Dole, 740 F.2d at 1447. Applying section 4(f) was consistent with prior
holdings. The Ninth Circuit had previously held, in regard to Moanalua Valley, that "construc-
tion of a highway adjacent to a potential wilderness area was a 'use' of that land." Stop H-3 v.
Coleman, 533 F.2d at 453 (quoting Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of Transp.,
362 F. Supp. 627, 638-39 (D. Vt. 1973), aftd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974)).
14 Stop H-3 v. Dole, 740 F.2d at 1447.
a' Federal Highway Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Highways Div., State of Hawaii Dep't of
Transp., Final Second Supplement to the Interstate Route H-3 Environmental Impact Statement
(1982) reports that the H-3 is planned to occupy the area separating Ho'omaluhia Park and the
Pali Golf Course Park. Additionally, the H-3 will use approximately 3.5 acres of Pali Golf Course
land. Stop H-3 v. Dole, 740 F.2d at 1448 n.6.
16 Continuing Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Star. 1783
(later reenacted as Pub. L. No. 99-551, 100 Star. 3341 because of clerical errors in the original
enactment).
Section 114 reads:
Sec. 114, (a) The Secretary of Transportation shall approve the construction of Interstate
Highway H-3 between the Halawa interchange to, and including the Halekou interchange
(a distance of approximately 10.7 miles), and such construction shall proceed to comple-
tion notwithstanding section 138 of title 23 and section 303 of Title 49, United States
Code.
(b) Notwithstanding section 102 of this joint resolution the provisions of subsection (a)
shall constitute permanent law.
1 See Sunday Star Bull. and Advertiser, Nov. 3, 1985, at B2, col. 1. Entitled, "H-3 Goes to
Congress," this editorial comments:
Governor Ariyoshi has adopted a controversial tactic in seeking to win federal approval
for the long-stalled H-3 Freeway.
The state administration has gone to Congress in an effort to bypass both federal envi-
ronmental regulations and court decisions that have blocked this ill-advised and outdated
1960's project.
It is an admission that the state lost the long legal battle and can't come up with better
justifications for H-3 required by our courts.
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which jeopardized the entire funding of the project and which had caused dra-
matic increases in projected costs."8
While the bill was supported by Hawaii's congressional delegation, the pro-
posed H-3 had detractors within the state besides the Stop H-3 Association.19
Notably, the administration of the City and County of Honolulu, which com-
prises the entire island of Oahu and within whose boundaries H-3 wholly lies,
was opposed to the highway's construction.'
The passage of the exemption did not mark an end to litigation. 1 In the
latest litigation, Stop H-3 Association, Life of the Land, and Hui Malama Aina
0 Ko'olau, plaintiffs, challenged the constitutionality of section 114 claiming it
violates the Spending Clause, 2 Separation of Powers,"3 and the Equal Protec-
All four members of our congressional delegation perhaps as a courtesy have gone along
with the state appeal for legislative circumvention.
SH.R. REP. No. 1005, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 784 (1986) [HOUSE REPORT] stated:
A recent decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals makes approval of this project
impossible before the 1986 and 1990 deadlines for interstate construction . . . . The
conferees also take note of the fact that H-3 has been the subject of litigation for more
than 14 years. During that time, construction costs have escalated substantially, and the
people of Hawaii have been deprived of a much needed highway. It is the sense of the
conferees that it is now time for litigation to be brought to a close and the highway to be
built.
"' Federal-Aid Highway Act, 1986: Hearing on S. 2405 Before the Subcomm. on Tranp., 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 47, 86, 297, 328, 329 (May 20, 1986). Those opposing construction of the
H-3 and providing written or oral testimony included the City and County of Honolulu, repre-
sented by D.G. Anderson, Acting Mayor and Managing Director of the City and County of
Honolulu; Office of Hawaiian Affairs (expressing concern about the Luluku archaeological site);
Marilyn Bomhorst, City and County of Honolulu Council Chair; League of Women Voters In
Hawaii (opposing the congressional tactic of exempting single projects from federal environmental
laws). The League of Women Voters of the United States also supported the position of their
Hawaii chapter.
" Acting Mayor and Managing Director of the City and County of Honolulu, D.G. Anderson
provided written testimony:
An arbitrary waiver of a long standing federal law directed solely at a Honolulu project
will preempt both the legal process and the local political process and deprive us of much
needed funds to address our local transportation needs. We respectfully disagree with Sen-
ators Inouye and Matsunaga that the court was irresponsible and that opponents are ob-
structionists. In fact, we support the court's opinion that the most "prudent and feasible"
alternative is not to build H-3.
Id. at 87.
2' 870 F.2d at 1419.
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, d. 1. The plaintiffs asserted that since H-3 was of only local
importance, given that it would connect no states and was allegedly regarded as unimportant by
the Department of Defense, the exemption that allowed construction of the H-3 and thus, the
expenditure of federal monies, violated the Spending Clause. 870 F.2d at 1427. The court con-
cluded that H-3 was of national importance as determined by Congress's statement in 10 1(b) of
the Federal-Aid Highways Act regarding completion of the Interstate System. Id. at 1429.
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tion Clause." Plaintiffs alleged, in the Equal Protection challenge, that discrimi-
nation occurred when Congress exempted the H-3 Highway from section 4(f)
of the Federal-Aid Highways Act.25 The Equal Protection challenge, a rarely
used challenge to congressional authority to make exemptions to environmental
laws, will be developed in this Note."6
III. HISTORY
A. An Overview of Equal Protection Law
Equal protection of the laws of the states and the federal government is guar-
anteed under the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment' 7 and
the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment 8 of the U.S. Constitution,
respectively.' 9 The U.S. Supreme Court originally interpreted equal protection
"s 870 F.2d at 1436. The Separation of Powers challenge was two-fold. First, although the
language of S 114 exempted H-3 from the requirements of § 4(f), the legislative history sug-
gested that Congress was making judicial findings of facts as its reason for the exemption when it
reported:
[The Ninth Circuit] relied on a highly technical reading of Section 4(f) of the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act, designed to protect publicly owned parkland. In reality, no
land from the park involved (Ho'omaluhia) has been, nor will be taken or used by the
highway . . . . Section 4(f) as [sic] never intended to block the construction of a highway
the design of which was specifically tailored to afford such special protection for parklands.
HOUSE REPORT at 784.
The other Separation of Power argument was that by removing H-3 from the 4(f) require-
ments, Congress had usurped administrative authority from the Executive Branch, usurped judi-
cial review from the Judicial Branch and disrupted the coordinate branches' functions of govern-
ment. 870 F.2d at 1436.
", U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
2" 870 F.2d at 1429.
2' The removal of the injunctions prior to the filing of new Supplemental Environmental Im-
pact Statements was also in dispute. These new statements were required because of the discovery
of new archaeological sites and a finding that further study of the impact of the highway on
banana farmers was warranted. 870 F.2d at 1425.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1 provides in pertinent part:
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
38 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part:
No person shall be. . . compelled in any crinminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
In Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Due
Process Clause of the fifth amendment to guarantee equal protection of federal laws, stating that
"discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."
" See generally, Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L REV.
541, 560 (1977)(discussion of the basic congruence of the fifth and fourteenth amendment guar-
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primarily as guaranteeing racial equality. In The Slaughter-House Cases,30 the
Court upheld a Louisiana statute which granted a company the exclusive right
to carry out slaughter-house activities within a certain area which included New
Orleans. The Court stated that "the one pervading purpose [of the thirteenth,
fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments was] . . . the freedom of the slave race,
the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the
newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had for-
merly exercised unlimited dominion over him.''31 There was thus virtually no
judicial intervention in equal protection cases beyond those involving racial dis-
crimination until after the early 1960s."* Over the years, however, the Court
expanded the equal protection doctrine to require that those who are similarly
situated be treated alike."3 The present significance of the equal protection guar-
antee is such that it has been called "the single most important concept in the
Constitution for the protection of individual rights.'"
Equal protection analysis is applied to government classifications, that is, leg-
islation or administrative rules which burden or benefit a particular class of
persons."5 While all legislation dassifies,"6 a classification is generally deemed
constitutional if it relates to a legitimate governmental purpose" and does not
invidiously discriminate."
The Court has required reasonableness or rationality in government classifica-
antees of equal protection).
80 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
8 Id. at 71.
2 Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). The
Warren Court expanded the scope of equal protection beyond racial considerations. Wilkinson,
The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61
VA. L. REV. 945, 947 (1975).
" F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 417 (1920) (state statute which taxed
all income of local corporations doing business within and outside of the state, while exempting
local corporations which did no local business from taxes on income from out-of-state business,
was arbitrary and violated the equal protection clause); Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 344 (1949).
4 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw S 14.1, at 524 (3d ed. 1986).
Justice Holmes called the Equal Protection Clause "the last resort of constitutional arguments."
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
"' Galloway, Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 121, 123 (1989);
Galloway, Basic Constitutional Analysis, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 775, 783 (1988).
" Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1023, 1068 (1979); 16A Am. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law S 746, at 802 (1979).
8 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
"The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrim-
ination." Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489, reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 925
(1955).
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tions since it began reviewing social and economic legislation."' The rational
basis standard assumes that all legislation has a "legitimate public purpose or
set of purposes based on some conception of the general good."40 The concept
of judicial scrutiny beyond that of the rational basis standard was first suggested
by Chief Justice Stone in his famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts Co."' The Chief Justice suggested that there may be cases where the Court
would consider "whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."" The Warren
Court is credited with developing a two-tiered system of judicial review, con-
sisting of strict scrutiny and the rational basis test.4 The Burger Court, dissatis-
fied with the all-or-nothing standards of "the rubber stamp of the rational basis
test and the fatal-in-fact, inexorable result under strict scrutiny,""' developed a
middle tier of intermediate scrutiny."' Judicial review of legislation under the
equal protection doctrine is now often described as a three-tiered system consist-
ing of the rational basis test, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny."o
39 L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2, at 1439-40 (2d ed. 1988).
40 Id. at 1440.
41 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
42 Id.
"I Gunther, supra note 32, at 8. Strict scrutiny has been described as the "new" equal protec-
tion signalling the Court's interventionist role, and rational basis the deferential "old" equal pro-
tection. Id.
44 Kushner, Substantive Equal Protection: The Rehnquist Court and the Fourth Tier ofJudicial
Review, 53 Mo. L. REV. 423, 427 (1988).
"' It has been posited that the Burger Court established the middle tier in order to weaken the
trend of activist equal protection started by the Warren Court and as a device to avoid strict
scrutiny. See id. The Warren Court's expansion of the suspect classification and the fundamental
rights doctrines was thus curtailed by the Burger Court. Blattner, The Supreme Court's "Intermedi-
ate" Equal Protection Decisions: Five Imperfect Models of Constitutional Equality, 8 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 777, 785 (1981).
"6 Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 793 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987); Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1434-35
(9th Cir. 1985).
There is disagreement in the Court as to the proper standards of analysis in equal protection.
Justice Stevens, for example, advocates the rational basis test for all classifications. See, e.g., City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451-55 (1985)(Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall, on the other hand, believes that the level of scrutiny should depend on "the
constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected," and the invidiousness of
the basis of the classification. ld. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
(quoting San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973)(Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
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B. Levels of Judicial Review
The first step in equal protection analysis is determining the appropriate level
of review."7 The appropriate level of review in turn, depends on the type of
classification or interest involved in the legislation."" Once determined, the level
of judicial scrutiny - the rational basis test or strict scrutiny - frequently
foretells the outcome of the case. This is not the case with the intermediate level
of scrutiny."'
1. Rational basis test
The rational basis test, described as "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually
none in fact,'" is generally applied to social or economic legislation."1 The test
is characterized by a presumption of constitutionality and judicial restraint 52 or
deference to the legislature.58 A court utilizing this kind of review must do a
two-part analysis of the legislation. First, the court must decide whether the
legislation has a legitimate purpose. Second, if a legitimate purpose exists, the
court must decide whether the purpose would be furthered by the classifica-
tion." If the classification is conceivably related to a valid moral, health, or
safety governmental interest, the court will generally determine that a rational
basis exists.55 The test only requires a reasonably conceivable statement of facts
to justify the classification56 and a "rational relationship to a legitimate govern-
"' Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 n.6 (1986); Jackson Water
Works, 793 F.2d at 1093.
s Galloway, Basic Equal Protection Analysis, supra note 35, at 124.
' Note, Alternative Models of Equal Protection Analysis: Plyler v. Doe, 24 B.C.L. REV. 1363,
1375 (1983).
50 Gunther, supra note 32, at 8.
51 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (equal protection clause not
violated by ban of nonreturnable plastic milk containers since the ban was rationally related to the
state's purposes of conserving energy, easing solid waste disposal, and promoting conservation of
resources), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166 (1980)(Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 which eliminated Social Security plus pension
windfall unless individuals met certain requirements for length of service and status in order to
protect the retirement program upheld), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1981).
"8 Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1078 (1969).
6s L. TRIBE, supra note 39, S 16-2, at 1442-43.
4 Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 793 F.2d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987).
15 Kushner, supra note 44, at 437. The Court has described regulations for the general benefit
of society as induding those which "promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good
order of the people, and ... increase the industries of the State, develop its resources, and add to
its wealth and prosperity." Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
" There need not be a "tight fitting" relationship between the legislative objective and the
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mental interest.' "" A classification is deemed unconstitutional only if it is arbi-
trary and has no rational basis."
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.' exemplifies the Court's ability to deduce a
rational basis in economic legislation. The Williamson Court upheld an
Oklahoma statute which made it unlawful for anyone who was not a licensed
optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit lenses to a face or to duplicate or replace
lenses or optical appliances into frames without a written prescription from a
licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist." The statute specifically exempted sell-
ers of ready-to-wear glasses. 61 The Court presented a number of possible reasons
for the statute in its decision, noting that "it is for the legislature, not the
courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement.'"'6
The Court concluded that it could not say that the statute lacked a rational
relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.
Similarly, the Court in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 3 found valid a grand-
father clause in a New Orleans ordinance which exempted vendors from the
prohibition against selling food from pushcarts in the French Quarter, if the
vendors had continuously operated the same business for eight or more years
prior to a certain date. The Court stated that unless the classification involved
fundamental personal rights or was drawn on inherently suspect lines such as
race or religion, the Court would presume the statute's constitutionality and
require only that the subject classification be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest." The "relatively relaxed standard'"'6 of the rational basis
classification. Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1437 n.7 (9th Cir. 1985). In Kotch v.
Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, reh'g denied, 331 U.S. 864 (1947), the Court,
in light of the unique institution of pilotage, upheld a pilot regulatory system although friends
and relatives of incumbent pilots were favored. In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61 (1911), the Court upheld a statute forbidding a landowner from pumping or otherwise
artificially drawing water containing natural mineral salts and carbonic acid gas for the purpose of
collecting and selling the carbonic gas as a separate commodity since the statute's purpose was to
prevent waste.
If the classification has a reasonable basis, it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it
results in some inequality." Id. at 78.
6 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973).
s Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78.
59 348 U.S. 483, reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 925 (1955).
s0 id. at 485, 491.
61 Id. at 488 n.2.
6* Id. at 487. The Court stated that "'the law need not be in every respect logically consistent
with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and
that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."
Id. at 487-88.
s3 427 U.S. 297 (197 6 )(per curiam).
" Id. at 303. The Court warned that "the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge
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test and the Court's deference to Congress have been explained by the Court as
"reflecting the Court's awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinc-
tions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one." 66
2. Strict scrutiny
Strict scrutiny is reserved for "presumptively invidious" ' classifications that
involve either a "suspect" class,68 such as race,69 national origin7 ° or alienage, 1
the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations" in areas that did not affect either
fundamental rights or suspect classifications. Id.
" Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
Id.
* Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982). See infra note 94
and accompanying text.
" The term was first used in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), reh'g
denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945). See infra note 83 for discussion of Korematsu.
Disparate impact on a suspect class is reviewed under the rational basis test unless discrimina-
tory purpose is shown. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977)(plaintiffs failed to show racially discriminatory intent or purpose in the denial of an
application for rezoning a tract of land to allow construction of racially-integrated low- and mod-
erate-income housing); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)(disproportionate impact of a
facially neutral written police recruiting test was not enough to show purposeful discrimination).
The Court defined discriminatory purpose as the implication "that the decision maker ...
[such as a state legislature,] selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Personnel
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)(Massachusetts veteran's preference statute
did not deprive females of equal protection since the preference was for veterans of either sex over
nonveterans, not males over females).
" Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1966)(anti-miscegenation statute prohibiting marriage be-
tween a white and a non-white violated equal protection). Strict scrutiny is also used in cases of
"benign" racial discrimination which benefits racial minorities but burdens the white majority.
See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (schoolteacher layoff policy which
would retain school system's percentage of black and white teachers was invalid since the policy
was not "sufficiently narrowly tailored" to accomplish its purpose), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1014
(1986); Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)(university racial quota system reserv-
ing seats for racial minorities for admission purposes was unconstitutional); City of Richmond v.
J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989)(city set-aside program which required prime contractors
on city projects to subcontract at least 30% of the contract amount to Minority Business Enter-
prises was struck down; city did not show a compelling interest in the apportionment of public
contracting opportunities by race and the program was not narrowly tailored to remedy effects of
past discrimination).
"0 See infra note 83 for discussion of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), reh'g
denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945).
71 j. NowAK, supra note 34, S 14.12, at 630-44 discusses the levels of review utilized by the
Court in three categories of alienage cases: 1) strict scrutiny is used for state or local laws classify-
ing on the basis of U.S. citizenship for economic reasons, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
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or a person's fundamental rights."' Fundamental rights are those rights "explic-
itly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, 71 8 and indude the right of
interstate migration, 4  equal voting weight,75  privacy, 76  and freedom of
association."
Under strict scrutiny's two-pronged test,78 the government must show first,
that the classification is required to promote a compelling governmental inter-
est,7 9 and second, that the "less drastic means" available are utilized, 80 that is,
that the means used to achieve the government's goal are "narrowly tailored to
the achievement of that goal.''81 Since strict scrutiny is deemed necessary to
protect liberty and equality,8" a dassification subjected to strict scrutiny seldom
365 (1971)(states may not deny welfare assistance to resident aliens or aliens who have not
resided in the U.S. for a certain number of years); 2) the rational basis test is used for state or
local laws regarding the distribution of political power or positions, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435
U.S. 291 (1978)(state may limit appointment to police force only to U.S. citizens); and 3) the
rational basis test is also used for federal classifications, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976)(Congress may impose residence requirements on alien's eligibility for federal medical in-
surance benefits). Cf Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982)(the Court
applied intermediate scrutiny to illegal alien children).
71 San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959
(1973).
78 Id.
74 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)(statute which denied welfare benefits to resi-
dents who had not resided within the state for a specified period of time violated the right of
interstate travel).
7' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (state apportionment scheme deemed invalid since it was
not based on population), reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 870 (1964).
"' Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)(striking down statute prohibiting state residents
from marrying without a court order if they had minor issue not in their custody and were
obligated to support the issue by court order or judgment); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (uphold-
ing woman's right to abortion), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973). But see Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3067 (1989)(upholding the ban on the use of public
facilities and public staff for performing abortions and requiring viability testing of fetus that
physician believes is of a certain gestational age).
77 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)(mandatory disdosure of NAACP membership
lists would violate citizens' associational rights).
78 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1014
(1986).
7' Id. See also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)(no compelling government inter-
est to justify change in custody of a minor child to the father based on the possible damaging
impact of racially mixed household in which the mother was living with and eventually married a
Negro).
" Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972)(quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960)).
* Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980)).
82 L. TRIBE, supra note 39, S 16-6, at 1451.
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prevails.8" The Court's dissatisfaction with the two-tiered system of judicial re-
view" led to the development of the intermediate level of scrutiny, "between
the largely toothless invocation of minimum rationality and the nearly fatal in-
vocation of strict scrutiny." 8
3. Intermediate scrutiny
Although the Court has not whole-heartedly embraced the intermediate level
per se,8g the Court has generally used intermediate scrutiny for classifications
based on gender" and illegitimacy,8 8 where the classification involved the in-
fringement of "important" rights or interests or "quasi-suspect" 89 means of
classification. Unlike the rational basis test, for which a mere conceivable pur-
pose is sufficient, intermediate scrutiny requires that the actual purpose of the
legislation be examined."' The Court articulated a "middle-tier approach" in
Craig v. Boren,9" in which it ruled that a gender-based classification was consti-
as id. at 1451-52. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), reh'g denied, 324 U.S.
885 (1945), is the only case in which the Court upheld an explicit racial discrimination under
strict scrutiny, according to L. Tribe, rupra note 39, S 16-6, at 1451-52. Although the Court
ruled that classifications based on race are "suspect" and thus subject to "the most rigid scru-
tiny," the Court upheld the exclusion of people of Japanese ancestry from certain West Coast
areas because of the perceived necessities of World War II. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. See also
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)(military curfew for people of Japanese ancestry
on West Coast upheld in the beginning of World War II).
" See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976)(Marshall,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall objected to the perpetuation of the "rigid two-tiered model."
85 L. Tribe, supra note 39, S 16-32, at 1601.
"6 See infra note 91, which states Justice Rehnquist's opposition to the addition of a new tier
of judicial review.
" Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)(state-supported university's
policy of excluding males from enrollment for credit in its nursing school violated equal protection
clause).
" Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988)(six-year statute of limitations to establish paternity of
illegitimate child was not substantially related to state's interest in preventing stale or fraudulent
claims); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978)(upholding New York statute that required a court
order of paternity issued while the father was alive in order for illegitimate child to inherit from
intestate father).
" Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131
(1982).
"o Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)(federal statute allowing Social Secur-
ity survivors' benefits only to women violated equal protection). The Court need not accept the
asserted legislative purposes "when an examination of the legislative scheme and its history dem-
onstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation." id. at 648 n. 16.
"l Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 n.* (1976)(Powell, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 429
U.S. 1124 (1977).
Justice Rehnquist strongly opposed the addition of another tier to the standards of review:
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tutional if it actually served "important governmental objectives and. . . [was]
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.""' The classification in
this case, which applied different minimum age levels for males and females for
the purchase of 3.2% beer, was not substantially related to the state purpose of
encouraging traffic safety, and thus invidiously discriminated against males of a
certain age.98
Justice Brennan noted in Plyler v. Doe'4 that intermediate scrutiny is used
"[o]nly when concerns sufficiently absolute and enduring can be dearly ascer-
tained from the Constitution and [Supreme Court] cases.""' Although the
Court generally reviews educational issues under the rational basis test,"6 in Ply-
le? ' the Court used heightened scrutiny to find that a Texas statute which
withheld state funds for educating illegal alien children and which authorized
school districts to deny the children enrollment in public schools violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Acknowledging that education was not a "fundamen-
tal right,"'" the Court nevertheless ruled that because of the importance of
education in American society and because education allows individuals to bet-
ter their societal positions on merit, the State had to justify its denial of free
education by showing that it advanced a "substantial state interest." 99 Justice
The Court's conclusion that a law which treats males less favorably than females "must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives" apparently comes out of thin air. The Equal Protection Clause contains
no such language, and none of our previous cases adopt that standard. I would think we
have had enough difficulty with the two standards of review which our cases have recog-
nized - the norm of "rational basis," and the "compelling state interest" required where
a "suspect classification" is involved - so as to counsel weightily against the insertion of
still another "standard" between those two. How is this Court to divine what objectives
are important? How is it to determine whether a particular law is "substantially" related to
the achievement of such objective, rather than related in some other way to its
achievement?
Id. at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 197.
93 Id. at 204.
94 457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
95 Id. at 218 n.16.
" See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988)(statute permitting
certain school districts to charge user fee for bus transportation did not violate equal protection
rights since there was a rational basis for the statute); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 34-35, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973)(education is not a fundamental
right under the Constitution).
457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
I8 ld. at 223.
" Id. at 230. Chief Justice Burger noted in his dissenting opinion that "by patching together
bits and pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analy-
sis, the Court spins out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of these cases." Id. at 244 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
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Powell, in his concurring opinion, explained the Court's use of heightened scru-
tiny as due to the "unique circumstances" of the case."' 0 Plyler demonstrates
the Court's ability to apply reasoning beyond that required by the rational basis
test when presented with particularly important interests.
C. The Court Has Been Reluctant to Expand Its Definitions of Fundamental
or Important Rights
Despite the emergence of the intermediate level of scrutiny, the Court contin-
ues to use the rational basis test to review social and economic legislation, even
in cases involving such seemingly fundamental or important interests as public
welfare °1 and housing."0 " The Court has, however, utilized a heightened form
of rational review in certain cases, leading one commentator to suggest the pos-
sible existence of a fourth level of judicial review, 03 a "rational basis with
bite."'O'° An enhanced form of rational basis scrutiny has been used by the
Court in cases involving semi-important rights, requiring the State to show a
higher level of governmental interests. The Court used such heightened scrutiny
in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,'"5 in which a purchaser of a
building who intended to convert the building into a home for the mentally
retarded was denied a special use permit to operate the home. The Court de-
dined to hold the mentally retarded as a quasi-suspect class, but did, however,
adopt a nondeferential heightened form of rational basis scrutiny to find uncon-
100 Id. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct.
2481, 2487-88 (1988), in which the Court noted that it had not extended the holding of Plyler
beyond its "unique circumstances."
101 Lyng v. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers, 485
U.S. 360 (1988)(amendment to Food Stamp Act prohibiting household eligibility for food
stamps or increased food stamps if household member was on strike was rationally related to
governmental interest of avoiding favoritism in a private labor dispute); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483
U.S. 587 (1987)(amendment to Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children statute requir-
ing inclusion of child support payments made by noncustodial parent in determining family
eligibility for benefits was rationally related to Congress's objective of reducing federal spending
and governmental interest in fair distribution of benefits); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
reh'g denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970)(Maryland welfare system which set a maximum monthly
payment regardless of family size and need upheld under rational basis).
"', James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)(upholding state constitutional provision which
required approval by a majority of voters in local referendums before low-rent housing projects
could be developed); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)(upholding forcible entry and
wrongful detainer statute giving landlords the right to repossess premises while excluding defenses
based on landlord's failure to maintain the premises).
10a Kushner, supra note 44, at 458. Kushner credits the Burger Court for adding "teeth to the
rational basis" test when reviewing social and economic legislation. Id. at 427-28.
'04 Id. at 458.
'05 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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stitutional the application of the zoning ordinance which required the special
use permit for the proposed home.'" Although reluctant to expand the con-
cepts of fundamental rights or suspect class, when faced with an alleged suspect
dassification or important right, the Court has been able to utilize a heightened
scrutiny to protect the interests it deems important.
It is well-settled that the right to a healthful environment is not yet a consti-
tutional right1"7 deserving strict scrutiny. The U.S. Supreme Court, however,
acknowledged the importance of a healthful environment in Members of the City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,' in which it noted that the aesthetic interest
in the improvement of the city's appearance was substantial enough to justify
restricting first amendment rights. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism"0 9 the Court
found substantial government interest in protecting citizens from unwelcome
noise and thus upheld noise guidelines for music programs at a bandshell." 0
The possibility that the right to a healthful environment may one day attain
judicial recognition as a constitutional right has been alluded to by the courts in
cases such as In Re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation... and Township
of Long Beach v. City of New York."" Also significant is the fact that at least a
'" See also Hooper v. Bernaillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985)(state veterans' prop-
erty tax preference for Vietnam veterans who resided in the state before a certain date invali-
dated); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985)(state auto tax scheme giving preference to
Vermont residents was unconstitutional); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869,
reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1120 (1985)(tax on insurance premiums giving preference to domestic
insurance companies struck down); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982)(striking down
state scheme to give Alaska oil revenues based on length of state residency). Kushner, supra note
44, also cites Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982) as belonging to
this "tier."
1o7 39A C.J.S. Health and Environment S 61, at 512-13 (1976). See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 451
F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971)(constitutional protection for the environment has not yet been
given judicial sanction); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. 928, 934
(E.D.N.Y. 1979)("there is not yet any constitutional right to a healthful environment"); Pinkney
v. Ohio EPA, 375 F. Supp. 305, 310 (N.D. Ohio 1974)(there is no implicit or explicit guaran-
tee of the right to a healthful environment in the Constitution).
108 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
100 109 S. Ct. 2746, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 23 (1989).
11 The Court also recognized the importance of a dean and healthful environment in Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974)(ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwell-
ings upheld as the ordinance was intended to enable "quiet seclusion and clean air"); United
States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669 (1973)(users of natural resources who claimed harm to their
use and enjoyment of the resources had standing to challenge actions of a federal agency); Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)(interest in an environment that was "beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled" justified the taking
of private property).
.. 475 F. Supp. 928, 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
111 445 F. Supp. 1203 (D.NJ. 1978). The court stated that "it is not 'desirable for a lower
court to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may be in the
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dozen states, induding Hawaii, have induded provisions recognizing the impor-
tance of a healthful environment in their constitutions.I' s
D. Congress Has the Right To Expressly Exempt Projects from Federal Laws
Courts have generally recognized that Congress may exempt projects from
federal statutes,"1 and have accordingly allowed legislation to pass constitu-
tional muster. The Alaska Pipeline is one such project exempted by congres-
sional action.1 5 The court in Wilderness Society v. Morton""6 enjoined the Secre-
tary of the Interior from issuing a special land use permit to allow the Alyeska
Pipeline Service Company to construct the Alaska pipeline at a width greater
than that allowed by Section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.1 The
court noted its awareness of the "severe impacts"1 of its ruling, but stated
that it would enjoin the issuance of the permit until Congress changed the law
either by amending the width limitation of section 28 or by exempting the
project from section 28.11 Congress subsequently amended section 28, remov-
ing the width restriction and reforming the law1'" regarding the pipeline rights
womb of time, but whose birth is distant.' " Id. at 1212-13.
113 HAW. CONST. art. XI, S 9 states:
Each person has the right to a dean and healthful environment, as defined by laws relating
to environmental quality, including control of pollution and conservation, protection and
enhancement of natural resources. Any person may enforce this right against any party,
public or private, through appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations
and regulation as provided by law.
See also the Constitutions of Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia; and J.M. Van Dyke, THE
ROLE OF A CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO THE U.S. OCEANS (June 27, 1988)(unpublished
manuscript).
1" See infra notes 115-31 and accompanying text. But see Judge Wright's opinion in D. C.
Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v. Volpe, 434 F.2d 436, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1970), infra note 169 and
accompanying text.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "when Congress desires to suspend or repeal a statute
in force, '[tjhere can be no doubt that . . .it could accomplish its purpose by an amendment to
an appropriation bill, or otherwise.' " United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 222 (1980)(citing
United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 555, reb'g denied, 311 U.S. 724 (1940)). Absent
express exemption, courts generally do not favor repeal by implication. T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153 (1978).
115 DR. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION: THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT S 5:07, at 10 (1984).
"6 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
117 479 F.2d at 846. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 is codified at 30 U.S.C. S 185 (1970).
118 479 F.2d at 847.
1'* Id. at 847-48.
120 Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576 (1973)(codified at 30 U.S.C. S 185 (1976)).
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of way."'
The San Antonio Freeway was similarly exempted by Congress. In Named
Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway
Department,"2' the court held that section 154 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act
of 1973,1"' which terminated federal funding for the San Antonio North Ex-
pressway, effected an exemption of the project from meeting NEPA
requirements. 
1 4
In keeping with the courts' general trend of upholding congressional exemp-
tions, the district court in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Weinberger"2 5 recognized
that Congress, by passing the Jackson Amendment,12 6 had exempted the Presi-
dent's report on the basing mode of the MX missile from NEPA require-
ments."' The court noted that "Congress can and does exempt projects from
NEPA. "128
"" Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1005, 1008 (Ct. Cl. 1980), Con-
gress further helped to expedite the project by declaring that the environmental impact statement
was satisfactory and by limiting judicial review of the Secretary's actions regarding the plaintiffs'
right of way. Id. See Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 584
(1973)(codified at 43 U.S.C. § S 1651-1655 (1976)),
Similarly, Congress added a new section to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) to overturn the court's decision in Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of
Transp., 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), that an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) had to be prepared by the responsible federal agency, not
a state agency, to comply with NEPA. The statutory amendment allowed a state agency to pre-
pare the EIS as long as the federal agency and responsible federal official provided guidance and
participated in the preparation of the EIS. Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of
Transp., 531 F.2d 637, 638-39 (2d Cir. 197 6 )(per curiam).
122 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975).
128 Pub. L. No. 93-87, § 154, 87 Stat. 250 (1973). Section 154 (a) stated:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of Federal law or any court decision to the contrary,
the contractual relationship between the Federal and State Governments shall be ended
with respect to all portions of the San Antonio North Expressway between Interstate High-
way 35 and Interstate Loop 410, and the expressway shall cease to be a Federal-aid
project.
'24 The court found congressional intent to exempt the Expressway from the requirements of
environmental statutes, supported by the legislative history of the act which showed Congress's
purpose of exempting the Expressway from federal environmental statutes induding NEPA and 5
4(f) of the Dept. of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. S 1653(f). Section 4(f) was not part of the
case since § 154 terminated federal funding for the project and approval from the Secretary of
Transportation was no longer needed. Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation
Soc'y, 496 F.2d at 1022, n.5.
125 562 F. Supp. 265 (D.D.C. 1983), appeal dismissed without opinion, 725 F.2d 125 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
M Pub. L. No. 97-377, 96 Stat. 1830 (1982).
.2. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Weinberger, 562 F. Supp. at 271-73.
... Id. at 271 (citing Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 788
(1976)(NEPA must give way when there is "dear and unavoidable conflict" in statutory author-
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In yet another case recognizing congressional authority to create specific ex-
emptions from federal laws, ' the district court in Sequoyah v. TVA18° ruled
that Congress had dearly and explicitly exempted the Tellico reservoir from any
laws opposing its completion.1"1 The cases discussed indicate that opponents of
a particular congressional exemption will find it difficult to successfully challenge
the exemption, given the courts' general acceptance of and deference to Con-
gress's authority to exempt projects.
IV. ANALYSIS
The district court applied a "rational basis test" to decide the equal protec-
tion claim in Stop H-3. 32 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit noted the district court's finding that "no court has found that there is a
fundamental right to a healthy environment.'"'13 The plaintiffs argued that the
appropriate standard of scrutiny was the intermediate standard and that the
exemption must, therefore, be "substantially related" to the achievement of a
governmental goal.1 ' The plaintiffs' argument for intermediate scrutiny was
based on two points. First, plaintiffs claimed that the environment was an "im-
portant right" and laws that impinged upon important rights were deserving of
intermediate scrutiny."3 5 Second, they argued that in exempting H-3, Congress
was classifying a single state and that, in the interest of federalism, this de-
served heightened scrutiny."3 '
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the equal protec-
ity), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d
346, 367-68 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981)(Congress has shown itself to be
capable of demonstrating its intent to exempt projects from NEPA)). See also Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 355 (8th Cir. 1972)("Congress has the right to
authorize projects and to exempt them" from NEPA).
129 See also Idaho Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Wirtz, 383 U.S. 190 (1966)(determining
whether section of Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 which provided exemption for employees
working for certain retail or service establishments included a sheet metal company and a tire
company), reh'g denied, 383 U.S. 963 (1966); Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610 (9th
Cir. 1978)(materials falling within exemption provision to Freedom of Information Act were
excluded from the Act), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
130 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aftd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 953 (1980). The district court stated that "Congress has the power to make exceptions to
rights either it or state legislatures have created by statute, as long as such exceptions are not
invidiously discriminatory." 480 F. Supp. at 611.
... Id. at 611. See infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
133 870 F.2d at 1429.
... Id. (citing Decision and Order, C.R. 507 at 7).
134 id.
133 Id. at 1430.
I Id. at 1431.
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tion challenge failed.18 7 The court found that the exemption of H-3 from sec-
tion 4(f) did not mean that the State of Hawaii had been classified at all, since
H-3 was part of a larger national system and was accessible to all citizens.1 3 8
The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to show the requisite purposeful-
ness in discrimination that is required under intermediate scrutiny. s3 And fi-
nally, the court concluded that even had a classification been established and
discrimination been demonstrated, the national interest in completing the Inter-
state Highway System was substantial. " " As a result of finding a substantial
state interest, the court also conduded that the challenge failed under a rational
basis test as well. " '
This analysis will focus on three notable aspects of the Ninth Circuit opinion.
First, the court did not exclude the possibility that the right to a healthy envi-
ronment may be an "important right" for equal protection claims. 42 Second,
the court found no state dassification for a project that is entirely within one
state when the project is exempted from national laws. " Third, the court's
determination of the national interest of an exemption was based on the initial
legislation from which the project was exempted rather than an examination of
whether a national interest was served by treating the project differently than
others.1 4 The court also found that congressional desire to overturn a court
ruling demonstrated sufficient national interest to warrant exemptions from en-
vironmental laws.1
4 5
A. The Court Did Not Preclude Intermediate Scrutiny When Environmental
Rights Are at Issue
The Ninth Circuit did not decide the important question of whether, when
Congress passes legislation to exempt specific projects from national environ-
mental protection laws, it necessitates the application of an intermediate scru-
tiny test. 1 4  Instead, the court conduded that even at this heightened level of
scrutiny, section 114 " still was shown to be "substantially related to achieve-
13 Id. at 1431-32.
138 Id. at 1431.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1432.
141 Id. at 1432 n.22.
, Id. at 1430.
"4 Id. at 1431.
144 Id. at 1432.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1430.
141 See supra note 16.
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ment of an important governmental purpose."1 48
The Ninth Circuit was sensitive to the possibility that a healthy environment
may one day be recognized as an important right of constitutional importance
in the context of equal protection.14 9 The court cited recent U.S. Supreme
Court opinions1 50 to explain the court's willingness to explore the "important
right" argument. 15 ' The Ninth Circuit, however, recognized that although the
U.S. Supreme Court has been willing to find that the environment is a substan-
tial or compelling state interest against which to weigh individual freedoms, it
has yet to hold that it is an important or fundamental right.1
5 2
The Ninth Circuit gave thoughtful analysis to why the environment may
indeed be an "important right" in the area of equal protection. The principles
that guided the Supreme Court to apply heightened scrutiny in Plyler v. Doe' 53
are arguably as evident in environmental cases. The finding in Plyler v. Doe that
although public education is not a fundamental right it plays a "fundamental
role in maintaining the fabric of our society ' " is not unlike the Ninth Circuit
concluding that:
We agree that it is difficult to conceive of a more absolute and enduring con-
cern than the preservation and, increasingly, the restoration of a decent and liva-
ble environment. Human life, itself a fundamental right, will vanish if we con-
tinue our heedless exploitation of this planet's natural resources. The centrality of
the environment to all our undertakings gives individuals a vital stake in main-
taining its integrity.'"
The court, however, was mindful of the opposing tension in current case law.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that it will apply intermediate scrutiny
"[oinly when concerns sufficiently absolute and enduring can be dearly ascer-
tained from the Constitution and [Supreme Court) cases .... ."'" In light of
the Court's reluctance to add new important or fundamental rights, the Ninth
Circuit's serious consideration of plaintiffs' assertion that the right to a healthy
"" 870 F.2d at 1432.
149 id. at 1430.
160 See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
1"1 The court cited United States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Members of the City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1, (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 870 F.2d at 1430 n.21.
The court also noted several District Court opinions that "anticipate eventual recognition of a
constitutional right to a healthful environment." Id.
19 870 F.2d at 1430.
198 See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
1 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
199 870 F.2d at 1430.
190 Id. at 1430 (citing Plyer, 457 U.S. at 218 n.16).
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environment was an important constitutional right was significant.
B. A Facially Neutral Statute That Singles Out a Particular Project Within
a Single State Is Not State-Based Discrimination
The Ninth Circuit recognized that Congress frequently legislates by exemp-
tion.1 57 The court concluded that legislating by exemption does not create state-
based classifications."' 8 Further, the court noted that, even were there a state-
based classification, an exemption from general laws is not sufficient to show the
discriminatory animus1 59 toward that state needed to succeed in intermediate
scrutiny.' 60 Thus, the court concluded that section 114 did not create a state-
based classification, or that, even if it did, intermediate scrutiny was
necessary..
By removing H-3 from the requirements of section 4(0, section 114 theoret-
ically deprived some citizenry of the protection of 4(f) requirements. 1 2 Plain-
tiffs argued that the harmed class was the citizens of the State of Hawaii."'
Plaintiffs maintained that singling out a state for detrimental treatment violated
federalism principles and therefore warranted heightened scrutiny.' " The court
decided that exempting a single project within a state did not amount to a
state-based classification. 1"' It noted that highway use would not be based on
residency, and that the harm would not fall on all state residents.1 '
The argument that an environmental law exemption might single out a state
to the detriment of that state, and thus merit heightened scrutiny, was articu-
lated in a concurring opinion in D.C. Federation of Civic Associations, Inc. v.
Volpe,' 6 a case decided on other grounds. The facts were remarkably similar to
those in Stop H-3: Congress had exempted the Three Sisters Bridge from sec-
tion 4(f) and the exemption was challenged. Judge Wright, concurring in the
decision, stated:
The net effect of Section 123, construed as Appellees insist it must be, is to divide
157 Id. at 1430.
158 Id. at 1431.
159 Id.
160 Id., citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
161 Id.
16' This assumes that S 4(f) was in fact not complied with from the beginning as the Ninth
Circuit had held. Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Lewis, 740 F.2d 1442, 1458 (9th Cit. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1108 (1985).




167 434 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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citizens of the United States affected by road projects into two classes. One small
group of citizens, the residents of the District of Columbia who will be affected
by the Three Sisters Bridge, is deprived of these important rights .... "'
Without mention of D.C. Federation of Civic Associations, the Ninth Circuit
did not adopt this reasoning. Instead, the Ninth Circuit found that section 114
was facially neutral, and that it did not single out Hawaii for different treat-
ment because the highway was part of a national system to be used by many
kinds of people. 1 This is consistent with the reasoning of Sequoyah v. TVA"'
where plaintiff, an American Indian group, claimed that a specific exemption to
the Endangered Species Act that allowed construction of the Tellico Dam,
which threatened the habitat of an endangered species, violated equal protec-
tion."' Similar to the court in Stop H-3, the court in Sequoyah noted that
Congress can and does make exemptions to laws.17 ' Additionally, the court
failed to find a discemable classification, stating that, "[t]he flooding of the
Little Tennessee will prevent everyone, not just plaintiffs from having access to
the land in question." '  Thus, the Ninth Circuit analysis was consistent with
Sequoyah.1
74
C. Congressional Assessment of National Interest Relating Back to the Federal-
Aid Highway Act and Congressional Desire to Overturn a Prior Decision
Represented a Substantial State Interest
The court was particularly persuaded that legislation exempting single
projects was commonplace and generally within congressional authority' 5 and
that the mere exemption of a project did not show discriminatory animus.1 76
108 Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
870 F.2d at 1431.
17 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), affd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 952 (1980).
171 Id.
178 Id. at 611.
173 Id. at 612.
174 870 F.2d at 1430.
176 Id. The court cited unsuccessful challenges to congressional exemptions such as Friends of
the Earth v. Weinberger, 562 F. Supp. 265 (D.D.C. 1983), appeal dismissed without opinion,
725 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(regarding the MX missile exemption to NEPA); Sequoyah v.
T.V.A., 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), afid, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 953 (1980)(exemption for Tellico Dam notwithstanding requirements of the Endangered
Species Act); Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981)(exemption from NEPA requirements). See supra notes 114-31 and ac-
companying text.
176 870 F.2d at 1431.
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The court relied on other examples of congressional legislation to demonstrate
that Congress often successfully exempts specific projects from general laws.'"
These exempted projects included the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization
Act," 8 the Tennessee Valley Authority exemption for the Tellico Dam from the
Endangered Species Act,"" and the MX missile exemption from National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements.18s
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act,18 1 cited as one example of
congressional authority to make exemptions to general laws, 8 exempted the
pipeline from requirements of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, just as it had
exempted the pipeline from the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act previously. 8 ' While the Ninth Circuit relied on the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act as an example of a state-specific exemption that
Congress enacted in response to a court decision,'" the Ninth Circuit did not
note that the national interest served by exempting the pipeline from various
environmental laws was stated within the statute. Although the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Act expressly provided in section 1651 that the pipeline was of "na-
tional interest" and that the amendment became part of that act, 8 ' section 114
did not explicitly state a national interest in the H-3 exemption. Unlike section
114, the rational basis for the exemption to the Mineral Lands Leasing Act is
discernable from the statutory language.
177 See supra notes 114-31.
178 See supra note 121.
178 Sequoyah v. T.V.A., 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aftd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
180 870 F.2d at 1430.
'Si Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Star. 576 (codified at
30 U.S.C. S 185 (1976).
182 870 F.2d at 1431.
... The Act also exempted the Pipeline from the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
and limited the period of judicial review of the law to 60 days following enactment. 87 Stat. 584
(codified at 43 U.S.C. S 1652(d)(1976)).
18 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 847-48 (D.C. Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 917 (1973).
188 43 U.S.C. S 1651 states:
The Congress finds and declares that:
(a) The early development and delivery of oil and gas from Alaska's North Slope to
domestic markets is in the national interest because of growing domestic shortages and
increasing dependence upon insecure foreign sources.
(b) The Department of the Interior and other Federal agencies, have, over a long period
of time, conducted extensive studies of the technical aspects and of the environmental,
social, and economic impacts of the proposed trans-Alaska Pipeline, including considera-
tion of a trans-Canada pipeline.
(c) The earliest possible construction of a trans-Alaska oil pipeline from the North Slope
of Alaska to Port Valdez in that State will make the extensive proven and potential
reserves of low-sulfur oil available for domestic use and will best serve the national interest.
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Likewise, the Jackson Amendment,"' which exempted the proposals for the
basing of the MX missile silos from NEPA, contained statutory language re-
garding the national importance of the project, justifications for the exemptions,
and alternative requirements to the regular environmental laws that would pro-
tect the secrecy of the project."' 7 In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Weinberger,'"
the issue was not equal protection, but whether Congress could moot an ex-
isting dispute with the passage of new legislation. 6 9
While Congress can and does exempt specific projects from general laws,
challenges on the basis of equal protection are scarce. Sequoyah v. TVA is similar
to Stop H-3 because Congress exempted"' the Tellico Dam from the require-
ments of the Endangered Species Act19 ' in an appropriations bill with the in-
tent of ending fourteen years of litigation."92 As in the H-3 exemption, the
statute was simply attached to an appropriations bill, with no statutory lan-
guage explaining the basis for the exemption."' Unlike H-3, the Tellico Dam,
at the point of the final litigation had been free of injunctions for nine years,
was 90% complete and was an integral part of the entire Tennessee Valley
Authority system." 4 Nonetheless, the court in Sequoyah was not compelled to
look at the motivation of Congress for the exemption, simply conduding that
there was no classification and no discrimination at all."' But in Stop H-3, the
court, in applying either a rational basis test or an intermediate scrutiny test did
consider the motivations of Congress when it passed the exemption. The Ninth
186 Pub. L. No. 97-377, 96 Stat. 1830 (1982).
187 Id. The statute requires, in part, that "an assessment of the environmental impact each
such system of the missile would likely have and the identification of possible sites for each such
system or missile," would be submitted to Congress. Id. at 1846-48.
588 562 F. Supp. 265 (D.D.C. 1983), appeal dismissed without opinion, 725 F.2d 125
(D.C.Cir. 1984).
189 562 F. Supp. at 270.
1.0 Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437 (1979).
... Endangered Species Act of 1973 S 2, 16 U.S.C. S 1531.
192 Sequoyah v. T.V.A., 480 F. Supp. 608, 610 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), a'd, 620 F.2d. 1159
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
'93 The act states:
[Notwithstanding provisions of 16 U.S.C., Chapter 35 or any other law, the Corporation
is authorized and directed to complete construction, operate and maintain the Tellico Dam
and Reservoir Project for navigation, flood control, electric power generation, and other
purposes, including the maintenance of a normal summer reservoir pool of 813 feet above
sea level.
Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437 (1979).
'" Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearing before the Senate Resource
Conservation Sub Committee, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1979)(statement of Hon. John Duncan,
Representative from the State of Tennessee).
" Sequoyah v. T.V.A., 480 F. Supp. at 612.
1990 / STOP H-3
Circuit considered the purpose of the Federal-Aid Highway Act' 96 and con-
cluded that Congress' desire to finish the entire Interstate System was a suffi-
cient basis for Congress to exempt the H-3 from the section 4(f) environmental
requirements. 
197
There is a possible incongruity in this analysis. While Congress did express a
desire to complete the Interstate System in section 101, it did not exempt all
highways from the requirements of section 4(f). Another layer of inquiry, one
that plaintiffs urged, was to ask what special importance H-3 demonstrated
that it warranted exemption.19 8 Under a deferential rational basis test the
court's analysis was probably sufficient, 9 ' but had the court actually been re-
viewing the statute at either the intermediate level of scrutiny, or even the less
rigorous so-called "fourth tier,"2 their analysis might not have been suffi-
cient.""' In Papasan v. Allain,202 the U.S. Supreme Court examined an equal
protection claim that a particular school district in Mississippi received far less
income than the average Mississippi school district.2 03 The disparity was a re-
sult of the district's selling of lands, prior to the Civil War, that Congress had
deeded to them.2 '" As a result, their current appropriation -from the State of
Mississippi was far less than appropriations for districts that generated income
from retained lands." 5 The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case, holding
that under a rational basis test, the variation in monies appropriated to the
districts had to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.2 0 " The Court
1" 870 F.2d at 1428 (citing 23 U.S.C. S 101 (1988)).
197 Id. at 1432.
198 Plaintiffs had asserted that H-3 was of minimal national importance according to the Con-
gressional Budget Office. id. at 1427 (citing The Interstate Highway System: Issues and Options,
Table C-I (June 1982)).
19 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961)("[T]erritorial uniformity is
not a constitutional prerequisite").
200 See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
01 Even when employing the deferential rational basis test, there is a suggestion that when
statutes discriminate on the basis of "territoriality," the court will assume the legislature had a
rational basis based on territorial differences. See, e.g., Toyota v. Hawaii, 226 U.S. 184, 191
(1912)(disparate rural/urban state imposed auction rates not violative of equal protection based
on assumption that state legislature "took into account varying conditions in the respective locali-
ties"); United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 677 F.2d 713, 718 (9th Cir. 1982)(holding
disparate acreage limitations based on land being west or east of the 100th meridian by federal
land reclamation law not violative of equal protection because the statutes are "rational legislative
response to climactic difference between western region and the remainder of the nation").
202 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
20' Id. at 268-71.
s04 id. at 273.
200 Id.
2oo Id. at 289.
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required that the reason for the variation itself must be examined."' 7 In Stop H-
3, the court did not require that the basis for the exemption be scrutinized; it
was satisfied to examine the importance of the construction of the Interstate
Highway System. Clearly, there was a legitimate government purpose in the
construction of the Interstate Highway System, but was there a rational basis for
singling out H-3 for an exemption to the environmental statutes to which other
construction of interstate highways must adhere? The only apparent purposes for
the exemption, as determined by the court examining the legislative history,
were desires to complete the entire interstate system and to overrule a court
decision that stood to delay the construction of the H-3."0 8 The court might
properly have conduded that those purposes, without an explicit statement of
national interest in the H-3 Highway, were insufficient to allow Congress to
deny those citizens affected by the H-3 the protections of section 4(f). The
Ninth Circuit might have decided that in order to merit exceptional treatment,
the construction of the H-3 must uniquely require special treatment because of
either its importance beyond the typical interstate highway or because of unique
features of the highway itself. Instead, the court was satisfied that lengthy litiga-
tion was a sufficient basis for an exemption. 0 9
The court found adequate national interest in congressional intent to exempt
certain projects for reasons related to completion of the system without regard to
the national interest served by the environmental laws. 1 0 Significantly, the
court did not look to the legislative intent of section 4(f),"' 1 from which the
exemption was actually drawn, but instead was satisfied to look to the general
importance of the Federal-Aid Highway Act to determine the national inter-
est."' While the weight of case law indicates that Congress can exempt specific
projects from environmental laws by separate legislation, and the Stop H-3 deci-
sion is consistent with that, the court might have required that the basis for an
exemption be something more than either a desire to overturn a court's inter-
pretation of the general statute or a desire to finish a project that is part of a
national program with a goal of completing the entire project.21 S
V. IMPACT
The Ninth Circuit Court was able to dismiss the plaintiffs' equal protection
207 Id.
2O8 870 F.2d at 1432.
209 Id.
2'0 See supra notes 114-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of these
exemptions.
2" See supra note 12.
212 870 F.2d at 1428-29.
s13 Id. at 1432.
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daims in Stop H-3 by finding that the exemption was both rationally and sub-
stantially related to legitimate and important governmental purposes. Tradi-
tional deference to Congress was shown in the court's conclusion that there ex-
isted strong national and state interests in support of completing the H-3
project. The court's failure to question congressional authority to make the par-
ticular exemption in this case or to consider the purpose of the environmental
protection laws from which the exemption was sought, raises the concern that
such congressional exemptions will not be subjected to meaningful judicial scru-
tiny in the Ninth Circuit.
The decision of the Ninth Circuit is consistent with the courts' historical
deference to congressional authority to expressly exempt a specific project from
federal laws. Senator William W. Bradley's statement that the vote in favor of
the H-3 exemption did not create a precedent for future exemptions from fed-
eral environmental laws is reassuring in this regard."' The Senator stressed that
"exceptional measures" had been taken to meet or exceed all other State or
Federal environmental laws.""' Although the Ninth Circuit did not discuss Sen-
ator Bradley's statement, it did agree with the lower court's assessment that
NEPA requirements had been met and that the exemption made moot any
section 4(f) issues.
The reasoning that any possible detrimental effects of the exemption would
be experienced by all whose "use and enjoyment of Hawaii's environment' 2""
was affected by H-3, Hawaii residents and out-of-state visitors alike, is worri-
some. No attention was given by the court in its opinion to the possible adverse
consequences of the H-3 that were raised by plaintiffs, such as increased air
pollution and increased traffic.2 1 7 The court found no state-based classification,
but instead drew the classification between those who would be affected by H-3
and those who would not. Based on the court's analysis, opponents of a state-
specific exemption would find it practically impossible to successfully assert that
2" 132 CONG. REC. S17417-18 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1986) (statement of Sen. William W.
Bradley). See infra note 216 for excerpt of statement.
" Senator Bradley stated:
Mr. President, in supporting the exemption of highway H-3 from section 4(f) of the U.S.
Department of Transportation Act, I want to make dear my view that this vote does not
and should not be seen as setting a precedent for departures in the future from the Na-
tion's environmental laws. My understanding is that exceptional measures have been taken
in this case to meet - and in some cases exceed - the requirements of all State and
Federal environmental statutes with the exception of this provision of the Transportation
Act. The facts surrounding H-3 make this situation unique and in my opinion justify
exempting it from the 4(f) requirements.
132 CONG. REC. S17417-18 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1986)(statement of Sen. William W. Bradley).
216 870 F.2d at 1431.
217 See Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1108 (1985).
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the exemption discriminated by creating a state-based dassification.
The court obliquely addressed the issue of the standard of review for the
exemption. The court did not expressly state that the appropriate standard of
review in this case was intermediate scrutiny, but it noted that the statute did
meet the requirements of intermediate scrutiny because there was no invidious
discrimination effected by the statute. The court also found, without rigorous
scrutiny, that the statute was "substantially related" to important governmental
purposes because the H-3, "as part of the Defense Interstate Highway System,
serve[d] an important national defense role." 21 Given the analysis used by this
court, equal protection does not present a viable challenge to congressional ex-
emptions from national laws.
The court did not expressly hold that the intermediate level of scrutiny was
required in this case, but significantly, it did not state nor imply that height-
ened scrutiny would be inappropriate. The court left the level of review open for
future adjudication. Given the court's deference to Congress, however, an ex-
emption would predictably be found to be rationally based, or, if heightened
scrutiny was demanded, it would always be substantially related to an impor-
tant governmental interest. A court using the Ninth Circuit's reasoning would
thus be able to avoid ruling on the issue of the proper standard of review for a
congressional exemption.
Although the court agreed with the plaintiffs that protecting a "decent and
livable environment" ' O was of "absolute and enduring concern, ' 2 2 0 it declined
to decide the issue of whether the right to a healthful environment was an
important right requiring heightened judicial scrutiny.22' The court instead
noted that even if the right to a healthful environment were an important right,
the statute would survive intermediate scrutiny. There is hope, however, that
the increasing national and state recognition of citizens' rights to a healthful and
clean environment may one day compel a court to squarely address the issue. 2 2
218 Id. at 1432.
19 Id. at 1430.
220 Id.
221 The court's position is perhaps explained by Justice O'Connor's observation that "'it is
not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary
to a decision of the case." Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3061
(1989)(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)(quoting Burton v. United
States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905)). If the U.S. Supreme Court is loathe to rule on constitutional
issues, a lower court's reluctance to rule on such an issue is understandable.
112 Arguments against courts granting constitutional status to environmental rights are based
on such factors as problems in defining and enforcing such rights, and the lack of qualified judges
to do the job. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judi-
cial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REV.
713, 715-17 (1977); Interview with Jon Van Dyke, Professor of Law, University of Hawaii at
Manoa (Oct. 2, 1989).
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The Ninth Circuit's acknowledgment that citizens have a "vital stake"2 ' in a
healthful environment may help to increase judicial recognition of a right to a
healthful environment as a constitutionally protected interest commanding
heightened judicial scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that state
citizens' equal protection rights were not violated by congressional legislation
which exempted the H-3 Highway specifically from complying with federal
environmental protection laws. The court's decision was based largely on the
legislative history of the statute and the general circumstances surrounding the
project. The court found sufficient national defense interests and state interests
in completing the H-3 to hold that the statute was substantially related to
Congress's purpose of completing the highway. Congress's ability to exempt
projects from federal laws also played an important part in the court's reasoning.
The court did not articulate whether the rational basis test or the intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny was the appropriate standard in determining whether a
congressional exemption of a particular project from national environmental pro-
tection laws violates equal protection. The court instead noted that the statute
did not invidiously discriminate since there was no state-based classification cre-
ated by the statute, and no discriminatory purpose was alleged or shown by the
plaintiffs. The question of the proper standard of judicial review in a case such
as Stop H-3 was left open for future adjudication.
The Ninth Circuit saw no need to decide whether the right to a healthful
environment was at least an important right, deserving heightened scrutiny,
since it found that the statute met the requirements of intermediate scrutiny
regardless of the constitutional status of the interest involved. Given the court's
considerable deference to Congress's intent to complete the H-3 highway, future




223 870 F.2d at 1430.

